Supreme Court to Review Viability of Third Party Retaliation Claims Under Title VII

By Stuart M. Gerson

The Supreme Court yesterday granted cert. to review the decision of the 6th Circuit in Thompson v. North American Stainless LP, 567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc) which held that a fired employee lacked standing to bring a Title VII retaliation claim as the mere fiance (later husband) of a woman who had brought a discrimination charge of her own. The 10-6 en banc holding of the 6th Circuit requires a plaintiff to have engaged in protected activity by opposing discrimination in his own right or as an actual party to the case of another. Close relational status alone, the 6th Circuit held, is not enough.  Reviewing decisions of other circuits holding likewise, the en banc court stated:

In sum, no circuit court of appeals has held that Title VII creates a claim for third-party retaliation in circumstances where the plaintiff has not engaged personally in any protected activity. Although plaintiff and the EEOC argue that the language of § 704(a) is ambiguous and that enforcement of the statutory text will lead to absurd results, we disagree, as do the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, which have soundly rejected such a cause of action. . . . [W]e affirm the judgment of the district court and hold that § 704(a) of Title VII does not create a cause of action for third-party retaliation for persons who have not personally engaged in protected activity.

An interesting aspect of this case is the fact that the Solicitor General, whose recommendations more often than not are followed, had urged the Supreme Court not to take the case, arguing that there was no split in the circuits and that this decision did not inhibit people who actively engage in protected activity from pursuing third-party claims. 

While this case will not be briefed or argued until the next term begins in October, it is interesting to note that the outcome is anything but clear.  Despite many assertions that the Supreme Court has been unfriendly to individuals, it has been willing to take up attenuated retaliation claims such as Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Co. v. White, a 2006 decision imposing Title VII liability on an employer who acts to dissuade a reasonable employee from bringing or aiding a complaint; and Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, a 2009 decision reversing the 6th Circuit and holding that a female employee fired after she stated in an internal investigation that she had been sexually harassed had standing to bring a retaliation claim even though she did not initiate the investigation or even file a sexual harassment complaint. 

Given the Court's recent history, the Thompson case bears watching closely.
 

Ricci v. DeStefano: Supreme Court Requires Employers to Show a "Strong-Basis-In-Evidence" That It Will Suffer Disparate Impact Liability

One much-anticipated decision in the employment law arena handed down on June 29 was Ricci, et al. v. DeStefano, et al. (07-1428 and 08-328), which I previously blogged about here.

From the SCOTUS LiveBlog:

10:01 a.m. Ricci result: Kennedy finds a violation of Title VII. An outright reversal 5-4.
10:02 a.m. Ricci is decided 5-4 on ideological lines. The middle ground suggestion of remanding for further proceedings is rejected.


Text of the full decision is here and a practical discussion written by my colleague is here. Attempting to reconcile the inevitable tension between disparate treatment and disparate impact, Justice Kennedy adopts the "strong-basis-in-evidence" standard. Writing for the Court (5-4) Kennedy noted: "We consider, therefore, whether the purpose to avoid disparate-impact liability excuses what otherwise would be prohibited disparate-treatment discrimination. . . . Our task is to provide guidance to employers and courts for situations when these two prohibitions could be in conflict absent a rule to reconcile them." Reconciling the two, the Court held: "[U]nder Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action."

Side Bar: While cameras are still prohibited from the hallowed chambers of the U.S. Supreme Court, it has wholly embraced the blogosphere with LiveBlog feeds on the Court's release of decisions and other matters.

NY's Highest Court Rules That Independent Medical Examination May Give Rise to Claim of Medical Malpractice

In a decision handed down on June 24, 2009, New York's highest court, the Court of Appeals, ruled that a claim of "medical malpractice", and not ordinary negligence, may arise from an injury inflicted upon a person undergoing an Independent Medical Examination (IME). In New York, medical malpractice is governed by a shorter statute of limitation - 2 years, 6 months - while a claim of ordinary negligence has a 3 year statute of limitation. The decision is Bazakos v. Lewis, NY Slip Op. 112 (2009).

An IME is a discovery tool often used by defendants in personal injury actions which requires a plaintiff to undergo a medical examination by a physician designated by the defendant. See NY CPLR 3121. In Bazakos, the plaintiff had a previous pending lawsuit arising out of an automobile accident and during that suit was required to undergo an IME by Dr. Philip Lewis - a doctor designated by the defendant. Bazakos claimed that Dr. Lewis, during the IME, "took [Bazakos'] head in his hands and forcefully rotated it while simultaneously pulling," allegedly causing injury to Bazakos. Two years and 11 months after the IME, Bazakos sued Dr. Lewis for negligence, and Dr. Lewis moved to dismiss the action as untimely under the medical malpractice statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed the action; the Appellate Division later reversed the trial court's ruling, and held that because the doctor performing an IME and the person undergoing it do not have a physician-patient relationship, the action was not "for medical ... malpractice" and was therefore governed by the three year statute applicable to personal injury actions generally. The Appellate Division granted Dr. Lewis leave to appeal and certified the question to the Court of Appeals whether the Appellate Division's ruling was properly made.

Reversing the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals held that "the relationship between a doctor performing an IME and the person he is examining may fairly be called a 'limited physician-patient relationship' -- indeed, this language is used in an American Medical Association opinion describing the ethical responsibilities of a doctor performing an IME (Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Code of Medical Ethics: Current Opinions, Opinion 10.03)." Therefore, the Court held, the claim that a doctor breached his duty of care while performing an IME "is a claim for medical malpractice, and it is governed by the 2 year, 6 month statute of limitations."

The Bazakos decision is consistent with a decision rendered two months ago by the Arizona Court of Appeals, Ritchie v. Krasner, in which the Court held that an IME doctor in a workers compensation matter owed a duty to exercise reasonable medical care when assessing the condition of an injured worker.

Supreme Court Makes It Easier for Employers to Defend Age Discrimination Claims

The Supreme Court (5-4 decision) ruled on June 18, 2009 in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., that in an age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), a claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his or her age was the "but-for" cause of the challenged adverse employment action. The burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a claimant has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision. This burden of proof is significantly more onerous than the standards for proving discrimination claims based on race, color, gender, national origin, and religion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. A more comprehensive analysis and discussion is provided here.